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Abstract. Amajor programmeof research on cognition has been built around the idea that human beings are
frequently intuitive thinkers and that human intuition is imperfect.Themodernmarketing of politics and the
time-poor position ofmany citizens suggests that ‘fast’, intuitive, thinking inmany contemporary democracies
is ubiquitous. This article explores the consequences that such fast thinking might have for the democratic
practice of contemporary politics. Using focus groups with a range of demographic profiles, fast thinking
about how politics works is stimulated and followed by a more reflective and collectively deliberative form
of slow thinking among the same participants. A strong trajectory emerges consistently in all groups in that
in fast thinkingmode participants are noticeablymore negative and dismissive about the workings of politics
than when in slow thinking mode. A fast thinking focus among citizens may be good enough to underwrite
mainstream political exchange, but at the cost of supporting a general negativity about politics and the way
it works. Yet breaking the cycle of fast thinking – as advocated by deliberation theorists – might not be
straightforward because of the grip of fast thinking.The fast/slow thinking distinction, if carefully used,offers
valuable new insight into political science.
Keywords: Democracy; cognitive science; deliberation; anti-politics
Introduction
The term ‘fast thinking’ is taken from Daniel Kahneman’s (2011) brilliant book Thinking,
Fast and Slow in which the author provides a masterly overview of his and others’
contribution to behavioural psychology. It speaks to the dominant understanding of human
cognition presented in his work and is part of a wider wave of cognitive science about the
way people acquire knowledge, use reason and intuition, and perceive their world that has
already had a major impact on the social sciences (through the emergence of behavioural
economics1) and public policy (as, for instance, through the application ofNudge approaches
(John et al. 2011)). This broad body of work is strongly supported by laboratory and field
experiments that have explored multiple dimensions of how people think and, above all,
make judgements,and it is justifiably regarded as the state-of-the-art understanding of active
cognitive processing (Kahneman & Krueger 2006; Kahneman & Klein 2009). As such, it is
an appropriate starting point for exploring how citizens think about politics. Our aim in
this article is to explore how these insights into how individuals think, make decisions and
process judgements could help in the understanding of the perceived malaise widely held
to characterise the condition of Western liberal democracies today, particularly in Europe
(Crouch 2005; Hay 2007; Papadopoulos 2013; Stoker 2006).
The essence of the insight from Kahneman and his colleagues is that humans commonly
use two modes of thinking. The distinction, as we understand it and propose to use it
here, is based on relative differences between forms of reasoning (which in fact might be
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arrayed along a continuum). The first mode – fast or System 1 – of thinking is intuitive. It
tends to require little effort and is characterised by the use of shortcuts and heuristics to
inform judgements. The second mode – slow or System 2 – of thinking tends, in contrast, to
require considerable mental effort, concentration and more systematic sifting of evidence
and argument.
The opening section of this article explores this theory of dual process thinking in more
detail and reflects on its relevance to contemporary political analysis and practice. The
intuitive nature of fast thinking can be contrasted to the bounded or more comprehensive
‘rational’ reflective and effortful style of slow thinking, but this distinction should be not
pushed too far. We use it, as Kahneman intended, as a heuristic rather than as the basis of
formal modelling. But we do so because it tells us something valuable about how citizens
understand and relate to the formal democratic system since, for much of the time and for
many citizens, intuitive (fast) thinking dominates in getting to grips with politics, as it does in
many other aspects of life. We set ourselves the task of exploring the consequences for the
practice of politics of the persistent influence of intuitive, fast thinking in citizens’ interaction
with formal democratic politics.
Intuitive thinking provides humans with a valuable and powerful tool, as Kahneman
is keen to emphasise, but it is a tool that has its limitations and can carry costs. Intuitive
thinking can use small amounts of information and with little effort can support good
decisions, but equally it can lead to misjudgements reflecting its inherent biases and
fallibilities. Kahneman’s argument is that intuitive thinking is dominant in human life and
that even when humans move to a slower, reflective mode their judgements are often
still influenced by intuitive thinking. In short, fast thinking cannot easily be removed from
decision making. There are connections here to the extensive and influential literature on
deliberative democracy (Chambers 2003), which in the terminology of this article would
support the greater use of slow thinking by citizens in their democratic political engagement.
A subsidiary aim of our article is to show how, if the ambitions of deliberative democracy are
to be delivered, a clearer understanding of the grip and power of intuitive thinking would
be useful.
Our reflections on the practice of citizenship are informed by and evidenced through
an examination of how citizens think about politics, drawn from the analysis of focus group
data.We draw on primary empirical evidence from 14 focus groups held with British citizens
between 2011 and 2012. In this article, we will explore in more detail the construction of the
focus groups and note some of the limitations of the evidence they provide. But we will also
argue that, as a method and for a variety of reasons, focus groups offer a valuable way of
exploring fast and slow thinking and, above all, the interaction between. Not the least of
these reasons is that their basic operation (discussion and deliberation over 1–2 hours about
how politics works) requires groups of citizens to think more deeply and extensively about
politics than they ordinarily would.
In the article we also present our empirical findings, looking at citizens’ general ways of
relating to politics and exploring the evidence that,when in fast thinking mode, citizens tend
to judge contemporary politics in a predominantly (indeed, on the basis of our evidence,
systematically) negative light. By contrast, in slow thinking mode their critiques become
more subtle and a more rounded, even positive, appreciation of politics can be discerned.
We go on to reflect on the wider implications of these findings before coming to a concluding
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judgement that the fast/slow heuristic is a useful complement to other ways of reflecting on
how citizens think about politics.
Fast and slow thinking: Its relevance to politics
Acknowledgment of the difference between fast and slow thinking can be identified in
political science literature even if those labels are not used explicitly. From much of the
study of public opinion formation (Clawson & Oxley 2012) applied to politics emerges a
consensus that citizens are relatively unengaged by formal political practice and that in most
contemporary democracies they pay limited attention to the hubbub of politics (Marcus
et al. 2000). Citizens’ preferences on specific issues are driven by what they perceive to be
the most salient information immediately available to them. Such information is processed
through a thin veil of values, prejudices and hunches. There is also a commonly held view
consistent with this perspective that this modest level of civic engagement is enough tomake
democracy work (Lupia 1994;Norris et al. 2009).Time-poor citizens in the information- and
opinion-rich world of politics do not require an encyclopaedic knowledge of the political
world but just sufficient information to enable them to pass judgements on the platforms
and positions of parties and the trustworthiness and/or competence of those standing for
political office. The cues and heuristics used by citizens and the resulting judgements are
good enough; indeed, they are their only realistic response to the complex nature of modern
democratic politics. In short, the broad thrust of an influential perspective reflecting on this
proxy for fast thinking about politics is that it is a necessary and relatively benign functioning
feature of contemporary democratic practice. But is that judgement fair?
A strong counterpoint to this perspective is provided by deliberation theorists
(Chambers 2003), who typically share a common starting position: the legitimacy of politics
rests on the free flow of discussion and exchange of views in an environment of mutual
respect and understanding. These advocates of what might be labelled ‘slow thinking’
argue that one of the weaknesses of contemporary democracy is its lack of space for
citizen deliberation; fast thinking predominates. For them, the practice of slow thinking
has an educational effect as citizens increase their knowledge and understanding of the
prospective consequences of their (political) actions. David Miller (1992: 61) refers to the
‘moralising effect of public deliberation’ which tends to eliminate irrational preferences
based on false empirical beliefs, morally repugnant preferences that no one is willing to
advance in the public arena, and narrowly self-interested preferences. Citizens need to be
given the opportunity to think differently and deliberative theorists support measures to
increase the prospects for slow thinking through the development of forms of ‘empowered
participatory governance’ (Fung & Wright 2003) or ‘democratic innovations’ (Smith 2009)
that institutionalise to a greater or lesser extent the procedures and norms of deliberation.
Moreover, there is evidence that large numbers of citizens, and not from the usual group of
participants, might be attracted by an opportunity for deliberation (Neblo et al. 2010). As
such, some of the charges of utopian aspiration against deliberation theory can be addressed.
But if Kahneman is right about the grip of fast thinking, it appears that another challenge
might be waiting in the wings. Can citizens reasonably be expected first, to escape from, and
then, prevent themselves from regressing into fast thinking?
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Table 1. Properties of fast and slow thinking
System 1 (fast thinking) System 2 (slow thinking)
Intuitive Analytic
More influenced by emotions and feelings Less influenced by emotions and feelings
Greater use of heuristics and cues More controlled and reflective
Relatively undemanding of cognitive capacity More cognitively demanding
Innately present but also acquired through
socialisation and reinforced through
experience and exposure
Learned through more formal tuition and
cultural inputs and developed/sustained
through critical reflection
Source: Adapted from Stanovich and Toplak (2012).
In order to address the consequences of fast thinking and to judge the respective claims
of those who embrace it and those who aremore critical of it,we need to take a step back and
examine in more detail the distinction itself. Dual process theories of cognition also refer to
fast and slow thinking more formally as ‘System 1’ and ‘System 2’modes of cognition. These
terms were first coined by Stanovich and West (2000), but the ideas and experimental work
on which they draw have a longer history. Table 1 presents a simple attempt to characterise
some of the properties of each system of reasoning as established in this literature.
There are several things to bear in mind when looking at a stylised representation
of this kind so as not to misunderstand the argument it carries about the differences
between System 1 and System 2 cognitive processing (Stanovich & Toplak 2012). First, the
properties listed for the two systems capture family resemblances that enable the two types
of thinking to be differentiated, but most of the features reflect relative rather than absolute
or categorical distinctions. In order to argue that fast or slow thinking is present, it is not
necessary for all the properties to be in evidence. Moreover, both fast and slow thinking
are broad categories capturing several modes of thinking that could be separated in a more
developed analysis. In particular, we follow Kahneman (2011: 13) in using fast thinking to
refer to a number of variants of intuitive thought – the expert and the heuristic – aswell as the
automatic activities of perception and memory. Some of these forms of thinking, especially
themore automatic ones,are literally fast (at speeds of less than 100milliseconds),but others
are less so and are more consciously formed and expressed as in the case of many of the
heuristics that help to drive the intuitive judgements styles that are a focus of attention for
Kahneman, such as those to do with how people anchor their decision making,measure risk
or forecast the future.When it comes to looking at how citizens talk about politics it is more
these less automatic but still intuitive forms of thinking that will be our focus of attention.
System 1 thought processes are intuitive and reactive though often efficient enough to
enable an individual to make sense of a situation quickly and effectively (such as to allow an
initial orientation that might subsequently be revised through more reflective processing).
System 1 thinking is an invaluable tool: ‘The main function of System 1 is to maintain
and update a model of your personal world, which represents what is normal in it … it
determines your interpretation of the present as well as your expectations of the future’
(Kahneman 2011: 71).
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System 2 thinking requires a lot more consciously focused mental effort. It involves
concentration and is experienced more directly as the product of sustained and considered
reflection, as a conscious choosing between cognitive alternatives. Its role is often to provide
an initial check on, and evaluation of, explanations and understandings offered by System 1
reasoning, such as might lead to a rejection of them if, as and when they appear problematic
or premature in some way. But such processing is not just about the rejection of hunches
as inadequate, for it opens a space in which alternatives come to be posited. That is where
a lot of the effort in System 2 reasoning is expended as it often involves abstract reflection
– hypothetical reasoning and cognitive simulation – and then the testing of those models
against more or less carefully sifted evidence and/or more abstract reasoning.We are often
cognitive misers and fairly reluctant users of System 2 forms of reflection, which typically
drawon a range of analytical, statistical and other complex computational strategies,because
of the effort, time and cognitive capacity involved in concentration and reasoning at this
level.
System 1 thinking is an unavoidable and necessary part of human reasoning. For much
of the time it does an effective job, but, as Kahneman was at pains to point out in much of
his earlier pioneering work with Amos Tversky on human judgement, the use of System
1 reasoning is prone to certain typical kinds of error (Tversky & Kahneman 1974).As
Kahneman (2011: 45, 85 and 86) comments:
If System 1 is involved, the conclusion comes first and the arguments follow. … The
measure of success for System 1 is the coherence of the story it manages to create. …
System 1 is radically insensitive to both the quality and the quantity of information that
gives rise to impressions and intuitions.
System 1 thinking tends disproportionately to confirm existing explanations, neglects
ambiguity and suppresses doubt; it focuses on existing evidence rather than prompting the
search for new information; it uses potentially misleading prototypes to make judgements;
it prefers to answer an easier question rather than prompt a more challenging one; it
overweighs low probability actions in coming to a judgement; it is more sensitive to change
than stable states; it can exaggerate risk based on high intensity or high profile events; and
it frames decisions narrowly. Moreover, as Kahneman (2011: 110) himself suggests (in a
manner crucial for what is to follow): ‘System 1 is highly adept in one form of thinking –
it automatically and effortlessly identifies causal connections between events, sometimes
even when the connection is spurious.’
There are a number of caveats that are useful for political scientists to have in mind
when adopting the fast and slow thinking distinction (Shleifer 2012). First, as Kahneman
recognises, the domains of fast and slow thinking vary across individuals;a topic that requires
effortful slow thinking for some might be a focus for fast thinking by experts more familiar
with the issues involved. Second, fast thinking is not a simple substitute for the idea of
bounded rationality familiar to political scientists since the work of Herbert Simon (1947).
The point made by the concept of bounded rationality is that even in System 2, slow thinking
mode, decision making is not perfect: searches are limited and only a few available options
are considered as time pressures kick in. But Kahneman’s point is that decision making is
more often intuitive and may never get even to the position of bounded rationality in slow
thinking mode. The dilemma for the analyst, however, when considering a decision error
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is that it is ‘not obvious whether to attribute it to System 1 thinking, System 2 failure, or a
combination’ (Shleifer 2012: 1083). Finally, there are tricky questions about the relationship
between System 1 and 2 thinking.How does System 1 feed into System 2, and how is a move
to System 2 thinking triggered?
Another consideration is that Kahneman’s psychological point of departure could be
contrasted with the more sociological starting point of Gamson (1992) and others (e.g.,
Walsh 2004) when it comes to understanding how citizens think about politics.In the former
case, the dynamic comes from processes taking place in minds of individuals; while in the
latter, the processes are viewed as more collective and involve the use of symbols and shared
understandings in order to create meaning. Given that politics is both an individual and a
collective activity, a case can be made to examine the processes of both individual and group
cognition. Our focus is on the consequences of a shift from fast to slow thinking. A more
group cognition focus could have investigated the influence ofmedia priming on issues or on
how dominant cultural ideas were replicated in the discussion.The different understandings
of politics that we explore in the fast and slow thinking modes in both instances most likely
draw on these social processes, but our concern is more on contrasting the positions than
fully analysing their origins.
From within psychology some query whether there are two coherent types of reasoning
and argue that there is a single process going on (Osman 2004). Others question whether
there are only two forms of reasoning and speculate about there being more (Moshman
2000). The critique that has gained most traction challenges both the boldness and seeming
rigidity of the distinction between the two forms of reasoning (Evans 2012) and the failure
to explore the weaknesses of System 2 reasoning.We have some sympathy for these critiques
and propose to use the distinction between fast and slow thinking less as depictions of
distinctive and measurable cognitive states of mind and more as two ends of a spectrum
of forms of reasoning. Yet from the perspective of political science, we would argue that it
remains valuable to operationalise in the analysis of political practice a distinction between
citizens’ political judgements that rely on faster thinking and those that rest on slower
thinking. In short, we want to use the distinction between fast and slow thinking as a
heuristic – which, after Kahneman (2011: 98) we treat as ‘a simple procedure that helps
find adequate, though often imperfect, answers to difficult questions’. The question we pose
in the remainder of this article is:What are the likely benefits and costs of the predominance
of fast thinking in contemporary policy exchange?
The role of focus groups in exploring fast and slow thinking
Focus groups were selected as our prime research tool to identify participants’ perceptions,
beliefs, attitudes and understandings of politics and political conduct and to capture
something of the inter-subjective process in and through which evaluations of politics and
political conduct emerge, are articulated and are negotiated. Separate group discussions
were undertaken with 14 groups between November 2011 and March 2012. Details of their
locations and demographics are provided in Online Appendix A. A facilitator, drawn from
the research team, led each focus group drawing on a topic guide (see Online Appendix
B). This covered early experiences of politics, asked participants to identify and articulate
common words and phrases they themselves associated with politics. It then turned to
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participants’ broad attitudes towards politics, their sense of how particular issues are being
dealt with by the political system, the pros and cons of the current political system and
proposals for reform.
Focus groups have a long history in the study of political attitudes, given the highly
discursive nature of the subject and the typically dialogic manner in which opinions of
politics are framed and reframed (Gamson 1992; Duchesne et al. 2013; Duchesne & Haegel
2007). Focus groups typically ‘produce more in-depth information on the topic in hand’
– and, crucially, they reveal more of the inter-subjective cognitive processing of political
cues that particularly interest us (Morgan 1996: 137). By virtue of the time devoted to a
limited range of topics, focus groups provide the potential for in-depth exploration of issues.
Moreover, their group dynamic adds to this capacity to encourage a shift towards slow
thinking for participants because the public exchange it demands persuades people to spend
more time ordering their thoughts and, in addition, be stimulated in their thinking by new
insights from others. So focus groups are designed to deliver slow thinking but they can
also facilitate a move from fast to slow thinking among participants in the discussion. This
might be seen as an almost natural feature of the method in that it provides an opportunity
for participants to reflect collectively on their initially intuitive responses to the issues with
which they are confronted. But this almost natural move from fast to slow thinking we seek
to reinforce methodologically.
In order to get people unfamiliar with each other talking in their own terms about
‘how politics works’ each focus group started with two quick starter exercises of a general
kind. The first asked citizens to identify and articulate their first experience of politics; the
second asked them to offer, out loud to the group, words or short phrases they associated
with politics. In effect, without much time for reflection and before the group dynamic was
established, we invited participants to give us their fast thinking responses to politics itself –
having first tried to encourage participants to think about what politics might mean for them
personally. Once the standard dynamics of focus groups kicked in, participants were moved
more towards a slower thinking mode as they reflected collectively on the associations of
the word politics they had identified and their respective first experiences of politics.2
Fasting thinking responses: Politics as the work of knaves, fools and bores?
At the beginning of each of our focus groups, ostensibly as part of a ‘warm-up exercise’,
we asked about participants’ first political memory. The vast majority (103 out of 151) were
purely ‘observational’, with the most frequent response being the recall of an election or
the actions of a major national political figure. It is perhaps not surprising that the focus
was on observational incidents given the limited direct engagement of citizens in politics
and especially the limited opportunities available to younger citizens (Stoker 2006:Chapter
5). Some more active first political memories were recalled, although these included taking
part in school debates and only seven of the participants remembered their first political
action as something active such as leafleting or protesting. In intuitive, fast thinking mode,
the bulk of observational and other responses suggest that participants’ immediate sense is
that politics is done to them rather than something where they are players.
Alienation from politics became an even more explicit theme in the responses to the
second of our ‘warm up exercises’. Participants were asked for words or short phrases they
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Deception (lies, spin, broken promises, unfulfilled pledges, etc.) 31
Corruption (corrupt conduct, scandal, legal criminality, cheating, etc.) 24
Feather-nesting (expenses overpaid, multiple houses, side-payments, nepotism, etc.) 20
Self-serving (self-interested, self-regarding, unprincipled, ambitious, etc.) 12
Politicking (confrontational, canny, mudslinging, not listening) 15
Privileged social background (public school, ‘old boys’ clubs) 8
Boring (mind numbing, dull, uninteresting) 7
Incomprehensible (confusing, impossible to understand, a mess) 9
Other (cuts, slow to respond) 6
Total 132
associated with politics. This association exercise parallels, in a simplified form, the standard
psychology test developed by Greenwald to enable the measurement of fast thinking
(Greenwald et al. 1998).3 Crucially, from our perspective, word association is one reliable
technique for accessing fast thinking.
When participants in the focus groups were asked for words to describe politics and
politicians they offered up 209 word associations.Of these, the vast majority were negatively
connoted (‘sleaze’, ‘corruption’, ‘duplicity’, etc.), a small proportion were neutral and only
seven were in any sense positively connoted.Let us start with the positive associations.They
were focused around the idea that politics is needed and provides a service. It was seen
to express ideals and in one instance was viewed as ‘fascinating’. The neutral words picked
were almost entirely descriptive, associating politics with the institutions of government and
parliament (nine mentions), political parties (nine mentions), elections (seven mentions)
and, above all, with the perceived functions of formal political processes (29 mentions):
passing legislation, budgets, raising taxes, debating and providing services.
By far the strongest response, however, associated politics with a series of negative
factors with strong and unambiguously pejorative connotations. Table 2 captures some of
the detail. What emerges is that fast thinking about politics today clearly taps into a highly
negative, even cynical, stream of thinking – a vernacular of political disaffection in effect.
Although a few of the negative associations capture a certain sense of the inadequacies felt
by participants (their lack of perceived political competence, for instance) the overwhelming
majority express a combination of distaste, distrust and extreme scepticism about how
politics works. These are not critical or challenging comments from citizens expressing
democratic concerns; rather they express a strong sense of alienation from formal politics
which, for them, is a land of deception, corruption and feather-nesting populated by self-
serving, privileged, mud-slinging and yet (and at the same time) boring politicians.
Fast thinking from citizens, captured in the initial responses in the focus groups, reveals
a starkly negative vernacular about politics. It also displays many of the characteristics of
fast thinking judgement that Kahneman specifies.4 The views emerged with little seeming
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effort and were imbued with considerable feeling and emotion. No one felt inclined to
challenge the negativity toward politics to any great degree (although later in the focus
groups, as we shall see, debate did emerge between participants). The negative views on
politics were expressed, to use Kahneman’s (2011: 105) terms,with a sense of ‘cognitive ease’,
they carried ‘an illusion of truth’ and there was little cause for challenge given ‘the reduced
vigilance’ mode of System 1 thinking.The exchanges were biased towards confirmation and
the suppression of doubt, and drew on a limited range of assessment options: politicians
were knaves, fools or bores.
The judgements formed in fast thinking mode were difficult to let go for some
participants. In several focus groups a discussion developed over the salaries of UK
Members of Parliament (MPs). It started like this in Focus Group 2:
Male #6: Too overpaid. MPs are too … they’re paid too much.
Facilitator: How much do you think they’re paid?
Male #6: £200,000 a year.
Some of the focus groupmembers then suggested that it was (correctly) amuch lower figure;
this was confirmed by the facilitator. A female participant in early fast thinking exchanges
expressed the belief that recruitment to politics was a path paved in corruption arguing:
‘You have to otherwise you won’t get in if you’re not corrupt. It’s like you’re in a clique
isn’t it?’ When a little later in the focus group a discussion developed about MPs salaries
with the true amount (much lower than others had suggested) being confirmed, her retort
was not to accept this new information but to state, ‘But then you’ve got expenses as well.’
This response was seemingly to confirm that while the salaries were relatively lower than
expected, nonetheless MPs were still a waste of money and corrupt.
Slow thinking about politics: It has a place and performs a role
The focus groups also saw instances of fast thinking giving way to slow thinking. In the
later stages of the focus groups, as participants had more time to consider and reflect on
the dialogue that they were having with one other, conditions became more conducive to
slow thinking. Time after time, across all the different focus groups, no matter what their
composition and despite changes in facilitator, we found that a similar pattern unfolded:
extreme negativity and cynicism about the conduct of politics in contemporary democracy
in the startingminutes of the focus group gave way to amore considered critique and amore
rounded judgement about what politics delivers.
Some of the most developed discussions in the focus groups revolved around the issue
of compromise in politics. This topic may have appeared particularly relevant given the
emergence of a coalition government in Britain after the national election of 2010 where
two parties shared power. For example, in nine out of 14 focus groups there were extended
discussions about the issue of compromise. From Focus Group 9:
Female #1: But a lot of politics is about compromise though?
Male #2: Well it is when you’ve got to …
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Female #1: I’m just thinking about Clegg, that to get into power, they suddenly realise,
Oh my god, this is all about politicking and about different parts of the
same party, not just between different parties.
Male #2: Well there’s no difference between them all nowadays in my view, but I
mean you can, thinking of Thatcherism, she wouldn’t have compromised,
love her or hate her, she didn’t compromise.
Female #1: She did.
Male #2: Well, not really.
Female #1: They were negotiating with the IRA whilst she was in power.
Male #2: Well that’s not compromising, that’s sense.
Male #6: She did on the council tax, didn’t she?
Male #2: I mean she was a strong person, a strong leader whether you liked her or
you didn’t.We haven’t got that now.
In FocusGroup 1 reference was alsomade to the role of Nick Clegg, the leader of the Liberal
Democrats who was the junior partner in the 2010 coalition government.
Facilitator: Do you think that one of the problems about politics, or one of the issues
about politics, is that, people are always compromising, selling out their
principles? Is compromise a part of politics or is it just selling out your
principles?
Female #1: I think a lot of the time it’s selling out. I think Nick Clegg’s a fine
example of that. He massively sold out to the big blue, but yes. Yes, it’s
not compromise, there’s no compromise there. It’s one way or no way. So,
I think there’s a lot of selling out.
Facilitator: That’s an interesting distinction. What’s the distinction between selling
out and compromise then in your mind?
Female #1: Compromise is you give a little bit, you get a little bit back. You don’t just
go ‘Oh I don’t want any of it then. You know just change it completely.’
There’s no kind of do this with this one, but then we’ll do that with that.
It was a total selling out of all his principles. He’s not kept any of them.
Most focus groups developed discussions of compromise along similar lines, seeing its
virtues but also understanding that sometimes in political practice it is difficult to justify. A
good example emerged in focus Group 6:
Facilitator: Sorry, should politicians compromise or is compromise a sort of selling
out of their principles?
Female: What do you mean?
Female: It depends if there’s going with the general opinion of the public or if
they’re compromising because that’s the easy way out. So if they’ve said
‘Oh, I’m going to do this’ and then public say ‘No, no, no, we don’t want
you to’ and they back down, then that’s fair enough.But if they say ‘We’re
going to do this’ and then they can’t, then they’ve just given back.
Female: It’s an empty promise.
Female: So …
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Facilitator: Yeah, so if they’re persuaded to do the right thing because actually that’s
what we the citizens want then if that’s a compromise then that’s a good
compromise. But if, but if it’s just easy politics for them, it’s bad. Yeah.
Okay. Any – anyone else?
Female: It’s give and take.
Facilitator: Yes.
Female: It’s give and take. If they, you know if we’re happy, if they say to us ‘We
know you don’t like this but we’re going to have to.How about, you know,
we’ll try and meet you halfway rather than, you know.’ We’re all adults.
These discussions reflect many more of the properties of System 2 or slow thinking
identified earlier in the article. There is a more careful sifting of evidence. There is a greater
openness to other ideas. There is a greater subtlety in how judgement is formed. The impact
of the discussions in slow thinking mode invariably also led to a greater acceptance of
the complexities of modern politics. When the reasoning processes were more analytical,
controlled and discursive in nature, it was, in practically every case, possible to see a
substantial shift in the tone and content of the thinking about politics. Discussions became
more subtle and reflective and generous to the spirit of what politics might be trying to
achieve.
What emerged in the discussions as the focus groups developed and unfolded was a
greater subtlety of judgement, with some participants offering a complex diagnosis of the
problems of politics and others even displaying a grudging respect for the political process.
Some brief illustrations of these examples of slow thinking about politics are provided below.
In each case what we see is greater care in weighing of evidence and a willingness to give
politicians and the processes of politics more leeway.
It is impossible to please everyone (nine comments)
I mean it’s alright having principles but everyone has principles and it has to come
down to one person’s principles at the end of the day.You can’t have everyone’s policy,
which they’re principled about coming in. I think they’ve got the most difficult job on
the planet ‘cos I can’t keep my other half happy and that’s one person let alone 56
billion, or million or whatever it is so I think they’ve got the hardest job on the planet
‘cos there’s probably not one policy that would satisfy us 12 people. (Male FG3)
The media creates a difficult/negative context for politics (22 comments)
They’re under the microscope now. New technologies mean that they’re far more
vulnerable to their weaknesses and to … and this is now being opened up.Newspapers
are … I think are different now to ten, fifteen years ago. Therefore, they suffer from
that. (Male FG7)
Maybe it’s up to us to make more of an effort (13 comments)
Also I kind of feel we’re all working hard, it’s difficult to find the energy to see my
friends and do the nice things never mind trying to get involved with something where
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I feel like I don’t even know if I could make a blind bit of difference anyway and so I
feel, which sounds so apathetic, I know. But that’s why I choose not to get involved in
politics, because I’m not really sure I can make a difference anyway and I’m not sure
I’ve got the energy. (Female FG8)
Not all politicians are in it for the money or self-serving (15 comments)
The majority become an MP for a good reason, they probably started as someone
going I want to make a difference, I want to be the one to make a change and then
it’s all a bit corrupt and underhand and they think that’s the way to go forward.
(Female FG5)
On excessive moaning (15 comments)
Aye, it’s easy for us to blame them and not do anything about it ourselves. It’s easy to
sit in a chair and slag someone. (Male FG11)
Life without politics (nine examples)
On the need for politics: ‘Yes, it’s a necessary evil, I think, really’ (Female FG10).
Grudging respect for politics (17 examples)
I don’t know much about politics but I like to see the good side of people so maybe
they do have good intentions so maybe they do just go in and say things that they’d
love to do but it’s not realistic. So they try and do as much as they can and sometimes
that will be nothing and sometimes that will be something and maybe that’s something
little bit of hope that maybe we should hang on to. (Female FG9)
In slow thinking mode, respondents were more forgiving of the mechanics of politics and
the tone of their critique became more nuanced although they were far from uncritical. For
us, this confirms the sense that participants did not experience some dramatic conversion in
their basic orientation towards politics in the shift from fast to slow thinking. They were not
being persuaded by the facilitator or their fellow focus groups members to shift their ground
much. In fast thinking mode their negativity was raw and emotional but in slower thinking
mode their negativity was more analytical and more carefully evidenced. Respondents
provided a number of repeated complaints about how politics works. The strongest themes
that emerged were: ‘politicians don’t listen’; ‘they are not accountable in a meaningful sense
for their actions’; and ‘they are a separate class or cadre divorced from the experiences of
“ordinary” people’. Examples are provided below under each theme alongside, in brackets,
an indication of the number of similar sentiments expressed by others in our focus
groups. In each case it is noteworthy that although the tone is negative, it displays the
expected slow thinking characteristics of more developed reasoning and more careful use of
evidence.
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They don’t listen (23 comments)
What does listening mean? ‘It’s the majority. If they listened to the majority of people,
normal, everyday people that go to work, pay bills, bring up children, work hard, can’t
afford a holiday each year and you’re just working to pay your bills, if they just listened
to what the majority of people said we could all say the majority. (Female FG4)
Accountability does not work (26 comments)
I just work on the tills, and occasionally help out stocking shelves. I still get a three
monthly evaluation on what I’ve learned and what I’m doing, where I want to go and
so on. And that’s just a menial, every … bottom wage job, and I’m still getting that.
So the ones at the top end, the politicians, should be under the same sort of scrutiny.
(Female FG12)
It’s us and them (33 comments)
But they do tend to be people that tend to go to private schools. Go to finishing
schools, go to university, and then go straight into politics. They don’t seem to go out
and do anything or see anything that’s going on and the things that they could be
commenting on. They’ve not worked, they’ve not really contributed to society in the
way that everybody else has. They’ve had this lush life that they had daddy’s pot of
money and then gone straight into the Houses of Commons and sit on their arses and
do nothing all day anyway. It’s not like us, they’re not like us at all. (Female FG1)
When it comes to the theme of politicians’ inattentiveness (‘politicians not listening’), it
is worth noting that the tone was invariably not strident; such concerns were expressed
more in terms of a certain frustration and an associated sadness.With respect to the lack of
accountability, a strong theme emerged comparing workplace accountability systems that
participants experienced as having a direct impact on their own lives and the (perceived)
lack of similar mechanisms (and equivalent standards) for elected officials. Finally, when
participants spoke (as they did frequently) of ‘us and them’ dynamic in the politics they
described there was, again, a very clear sense of regret – here couched typically in terms of
a certain nostalgia occasioned by the passing of a previous era in which the social gap felt
less wide.Other complaints about politics that received a significant airing in the discussion
included the degree of self-interest driving political actors; the tendency of elected leaders to
break their promises; the complexity of the process; the degree of spin and mud-slinging in
political discourse; the lack of clear information with which to judge political performance;
and the perceived incapacity of citizen action and engagement to make a difference.
Discussion: Reflections on fast and slow thinking about politics
The evidence from our focus groups suggests that the workings of modern politics can look
very different to citizens depending on whether they are in fast or slow thinking mode
and that the consequences for democratic practice might be non-trivial. In fast thinking
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mode, focus group participants invariably identified substantial concerns about how politics
works and in particular its (seemingly pervasive and inexorable) tendency to deception,
corruption, feather-nesting and so on. If politics is conducted only through a series of fast
thinking exchanges in contemporary democracies, then it appears likely that citizens will be
trapped in a cycle of negativity about politics that, in turn, supports a level of cynicism and
disengagement from politics that leads to questions about its sustainability. Stepping beyond
the evidence we are able to present in the focus groups we can find further support for the
emerging concern about the negativity shaped by fast thinking.
For a citizen on the margins of politics, System 1 is screaming at them that when they
engage with politics they should fear being duped; when dealing with something unknown,
and something that it would take considerable effort to get to know, it is reasonable to jump
from that fear to the assumption that one is likely to be tricked (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse
2002).Yet, in a slower thinkingmode,deception is somewhat recast as an unavoidable (if still
unfortunate) feature of all politics to a degree (Mackie 1998).What becomes important here
is not so much the prevalence of deception per se as the capacity to identify and challenge
the deceptions of those in authority and to hold them to account for their actions and
their recounting of their actions. In fast thinking mode, the focus is on being deceived; in
slower thinking mode, it is about how democracy enables a citizen (or citizens collectively)
to challenge deception.
The sense that corruption is widespread in Britain compared to other countries is
arguably misplaced, as Allen and Birch (2015) note.But it may well reflect judgement biases,
as they go on to suggest, that in turn these have their origins in the anchoring and availability
biases that characterise System 1 thinking.More specifically, the judgement of citizens about
the behaviour of politicians is anchored by their own work environment which (in their
perception) is generally more controlled and subject to immediate supervisory oversight
than that, for example, of an elected representative. The news media and popular culture
are all too willing to bring to the attention of citizens claims of corrupt practices, making
such behaviour an accessible and available script for citizens trying to understand political
decisionmaking.Similarly, the fears of citizens about feather-bedding and expenses scandals
may reflect a judgement driven by another classic System 1 type error: the tendency to
extrapolate and generalise too readily from vivid (yet still anecdotal) examples. One story
of a politician getting his personal moat cleaned at taxpayers’ expense is worth a thousand
statistics about the care taken by other MPs in claiming expenses – as long, that is, as one
remains within a fast thinking response mode.
Toomuch System 1 judgement thrown at any institution or process may create a negative
prism for the focus of attention.In fast thinkingmode the very nature of politics – its conflicts,
rhetoric and practices – tend to attract negative judgements. In addition, the way that
politics has increasingly been packaged over the last few decades opens up opportunities
for fast thinking responses to it. Politics in this respect may be its own worst enemy. Three
developments in contemporary politics have facilitated System 1 fast thinking responses
from citizens. First the marketisation of party and other stakeholders’ campaigning, appeals
and approaches have grown enormously, often deliberately trying to lean on fast thinking
mechanisms (Lees-Marshment 2001).Voters are not to be engaged in reflective debate, but
hooked by sound bites, ‘dog whistle’ issues and, above all, through targeted marketing. All
of these approaches confine political communication to System 1 exchanges.
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Second, the mediatisation of politics plays far more to System 1 than System 2 modes of
reasoning (Papadopoulos 2013). The core role of the media in presenting contemporary
politics is widely acknowledged and indeed understood by citizens themselves (Street
2011; Hansard Society 2012). The impact of the media is complex, and mainstream
and new social media can and do play a role in challenging governments and driving
accountability. But commercial pressure to maximise audiences can lead to parts of the
media in some countries with a stronger market model presenting a ‘dumbed down’
version of the news, or sensationalist and negative coverage focused on scandals and
personalities, reducing complex problems to simple terms (Hallin & Mancini 2004; Crick
2005; Mazzoleni 2008).The emergence of intense 24-hour media coverage of politics and
the parallel developments in social media have developed a sense that politics is obsessively
short-term, focused on spin and presentation and lacks the substance to demand engaged
public attention.
Does it matter that fast thinking dominates?As noted earlier, there is a coherent position
in political science that argues that the effects of fast thinking are benign. Perhaps citizens
need the emotional charge of fast thinking to tee up their engagement with political issues;
without fast thinking exchanges, most issues slip past most citizens unnoticed (Marcus et al.
2000). In the light of the evidence we have presented, we are not convinced by this rather
convenient line of thought. Fast thinking may smooth the path of politics in contemporary
democracies, but it may also be having a long-term corrosive effect on citizens’ attitudes to
politics and their faith in the political system. Our focus groups reveal citizens alienated,
hostile or, at best, queasy about the conduct of politics. The construction of modern politics
and the fast thinking diet it offers may be sowing the seeds of its own decline.
Our findings, though, also raise tricky issues for deliberative advocates for more slow
thinking.Our findings provide for politics a particular illustration of Kahneman’s convincing
claims that fast thinking is the default form of human reasoning and only moved away from
with effort and in an unusual context. The importance of understanding the grip of fast
thinking becomes clearer still following Goodin and Niemeyer’s (2003) study of a citizens’
jury asked to reflect on an environmental issue in Australia. It found that it was the internal
reflection of the jurors, rather than the public discussion and deliberation, which did the
bulk of the work in changing participants’minds.But the depth and intensity of that internal
reflection is subject to the same cognitive tropes that have been at the heart of this article.
Participants in any of the democratic/deliberative innovations referred to above may have
done their internal thinking in slowmode,but theymay also havemoved only a little beyond
intuitive fast thinking mode. In short, any institutional innovation may provide a path to
slow thinking, but it is far from clear that even those who are participants will stick to that
path. Moreover, the effort to engage in slow thinking may ebb away quickly and may have
disappeared altogether when it comes to public discussion. There is, of course, the broader
point still, that engaging large numbers of citizens in these sorts of democratic innovations
remains a significant challenge – one painfully recognised by their advocates (Smith 2009).
The grip of fast thinking plainly can be broken as our research suggests, but it is not a
straightforward task.
There are complexities to consider. The literature on deliberative democracy typically
assumes that the interaction between citizens in an idealised democratic polity is (and/or
gives rise to) a collective process of deliberation. Yet, as our focus groups in effect show,
C© 2015 European Consortium for Political Research
18 GERRY STOKER, COLIN HAY &MATTHEW BARR
deliberation – even in public and through an extended process of social interaction – can
be as much individual as collective. What we tended to witness was citizens recalibrating
and revising (slow thinking) their intuitive responses to political cues (fast responses) as
they discussed and debated the issues collectively. It would be difficult, we suggest, to see
this as the group working out and developing a shared deliberative consensus (as in the
Habermasian ideal that underpins so much of the literature on deliberative democracy).
Much more credible, we think, is to see this process as citizens as individuals revising
and developing their own views as they debate and engage with others and ‘think out
loud’ in public. This form of socially mediated yet individual deliberation is, we contend,
insufficiently explored in contemporary political science.
Conclusions
If the distinction between fast and slow thinking is viewed as relative, a characterisation
of two broad types of thinking, then the construction of our focus groups has enabled us
to demonstrate the impact of a shift from fast to slow thinking about politics. When in
fast thinking mode our evidence suggests citizens will tend towards a general negativity,
even hostility, towards politics. In slow thinking mode our findings reveal citizens are more
forgiving towards politics, although not uncritical. In fast or intuitive thinking mode the
judgements of citizens do not weigh evidence too carefully, infer or even invent causes
of events and the intentions of others, and operate in a context of reduced vigilance for
countervailing evidence and argument and exaggerated emotional consistency. The impact
of the fast thinking mode therefore creates a difficult context for democratic politics and
its problems, and the positive dynamics of the slow thinking mode make the case for
democratic deliberative innovation. Yet here is the rub for contemporary democracies.
Modern marketing techniques favoured by political elites lead invariably down the path
of reinforcing the fast thinking mode and the reforms favoured to support slow thinking,
favoured by deliberative democrats, may be difficult to deliver because of the embedded
preference for intuitive mode thinking in human decision making.
It is not that most citizens cannot engage in slow thinking because, as our focus groups
showed, different groups with a range of demographic make-ups all had many individuals
who demonstrated their capacity to travel down that path.What is in question is how to get
citizens to sustain the effort, commitment and time required when in that mode. In short,
understanding the grip and consequences of fast thinking poses challenges to both advocates
of deliberation as the antidote to democratic malaise (since it shows how entrenched fast
thinking is) as well as to those who see fast thinking as fit for purpose (since it shows how
profoundly cynical about politics such thinking has typically become).
One factor in any consideration of how to respond to negativity towards politics might
be the reform ideas of citizens themselves. Our focus groups ended with a request to
participants to write down their reform ideas. An analysis of these ideas produced a set of
options that were later tested in a wider representative survey of British citizens conducted
in late 2012. There was a considerable consistency between both focus group participants
and the wider representative sample about favoured reform ideas, and the fulcrum of change
for both was to improve the presentation, transparency and accountability of representative
politics while allowing some greater scope for a direct say over decisions by citizens. The
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slow thinking of citizens about how to make a better politics might just be a good starting
point for dealing with the negativity about politics shaped, in part, by the dominance of fast
thinking in political exchange in contemporary democracies.
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Notes
1. For an excellent review that captures the importance of Kahneman’s work for economics, see Shleifer
(2012).
2. We offer access to all of the available comments on our university website to enable the reader to check
whether our interpretation and classification of the comments is fair. Full transcripts of all the focus
groups are available from the ESRC DataStore: http://discover.ukdataservice.ac.uk/catalogue/?sn=
850697&type=Data%20catalogue
3. There are techniques other than the Implicit Association Test (IAT) to explore the differences between
explicit and implicit attitudes, and these include exploratory eye tracking research (see Beattie &
McGuire 2014).
4. As well as Table 1, see the list of characteristics and discussion in Kahneman (2011: 105).
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